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Village Ordinance Prohibiting Crematory Not Preempted by State Law Under Either Express or Conflict Preemption Criteria

The Second Department determined that the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law, which includes “crematory” in the definition of cemetery, did not pre-empt a village ordinance prohibiting the construction of a crematory in petitioner’s cemetery.  Both express preemption and conflict preemption were addressed by the court:

The Supreme Court correctly determined that Not-for-Profit Corporation Law article 15 did not preempt any attempt at local regulation of cemeteries under the doctrine of “field preemption.” That doctrine “applies under any of three different scenarios. First, an express statement in the state statute explicitly avers that it preempts all local laws on the same subject matter. Second, a declaration of state policy evinces the intent of the Legislature to preempt local laws on the same subject matter. And third, the Legislature’s enactment of a comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme in an area in controversy is deemed to demonstrate an intent to preempt local laws” … . * * *

Thus, although Not-for-Profit Corporation Law article 15 governs the operation of corporations which own and manage cemeteries, it does not expressly preempt zoning ordinances relating to land use by cemeteries. Further, there is no declaration of State policy in either Not-for-Profit Corporation Law article 15 or the rules and regulations promulgated under it that evinces any such intent (see N-PCL 1501…). Finally, the regulatory scheme under Not-for-Profit Corporation Law article 15 does not evince the Legislature’s desire to preempt the local zoning law … . Accordingly, the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law did not preempt the field of cemetery regulation.

The Supreme Court properly determined that Not-for-Profit Corporation Law § 1502(d) does not invalidate the Village’s more restrictive definition of “cemetery” under the doctrine of conflict preemption. The Not-for-Profit Corporation Law is addressed to the management of cemetery corporations, and the definition contained in the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law addresses the scope of that law. By contrast, the Village Code’s definition of “cemetery,” which excludes crematories, is addressed to land use, which is another matter entirely. Since the differing definitions of “cemetery” are addressed to differing purposes, they are not in direct conflict … . Matter of Oakwood Cemetery v Village/Town of Mount Kisco, 2014 NY Slip Op 01616, 2nd Dept 3-12-14

 

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