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DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO MAKE A PERSONAL STATEMENT BEFORE RESENTENCING, RESENTENCE REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s resentence, determined defendant should have been allowed to make a sentence before the sentence was pronounced:

At that proceeding, the defendant requested an opportunity to address the court. The court denied the defendant’s request. The defendant appeals, and we reverse.

A defendant is entitled “to make a statement personally in his or her own behalf, and before pronouncing sentence the court must ask the defendant whether he or she wishes to make such a statement” ( CPL 380.50 [1]). “[T]he provisions of CPL 380.50 apply to occasions of resentencing as well as to those of initial sentencing”  … . Here, the defendant was denied that opportunity. Accordingly, we remit the matter … for resentencing to give the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his behalf … . People v Taylor, 2020 NY Slip Op 04413, Second Dept 8-5-20

 

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