You are here: / / THE REFEREE’S REPORT, WHICH IS MERELY ADVISORY AND IS NOT BINDING...
,

THE REFEREE’S REPORT, WHICH IS MERELY ADVISORY AND IS NOT BINDING ON THE COURT, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE COURT BECAUSE IT WAS BASED UPON BUSINESS RECORDS THAT WERE NOT PROVIDED TO THE REFEREE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the referee’s report should not have been accepted because it was based upon business records which were not in evidence:

… Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was to reject the referee’s report. “The report of a referee should be confirmed whenever the findings are substantially supported by the record, and the referee has clearly defined the issues and resolved matters of credibility” … . “The referee’s findings and recommendations are advisory only and have no binding effect on the court, which remains the ultimate arbiter of the dispute” … .

Here, in addition to the outstanding principal amount of the loan, along with accrued interest and charges, the referee included $507,095.35 in “Tax Disbursements” and $27,705.00 in “Hazard Insurance Disbursements” as part of the total amount due to the plaintiff. The defendant correctly objected to the inclusion of these disbursements on the ground that they were calculated based on business records that were never produced by the plaintiff or submitted to the referee (see CPLR 4518[a] …). HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Cherestal, 2019 NY Slip Op 08660, Second Dept 12-4-19

 

You might also like
Prosecutor’s Circumvention of the Bruton Rule Required Reversal
ALTHOUGH THE ATTORNEY REPRESENTING HIS MOTHER’S ESTATE IN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE/WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION MAY BE A WITNESS, UNDER THE PARTICULAR FACTS OF THE CASE, DISQUALIFICATION PURSUANT TO THE ADVOCATE-WITNESS RULE WAS NOT REQUIRED (SECOND DEPT).
“UNITED METHODIST CHURCH” IS NOT A JURAL ENTITY WHICH CAN BE SUED IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT LAWSUIT (SECOND DEPT).
UGELL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED AS A CANDIDATE FOR TOWN SUPERVISOR; THE FACT THAT UGELL IS A TOWN JUSTICE IS NOT DISQUALIFYING; ELECTION FRAUD MUST BE PROVEN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, LACKING HERE (SECOND DEPT).
FALURE TO COMPLY WITH THE MODE OF SERVICE SPECIFIED IN AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE DEPRIVES THE COURT OF JURISDICTION (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE AREA WHERE PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY SLIPPED AND FELL WAS LAST INSPECTED OR CLEANED; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, GRANTED DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON A GROUND NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, I.E., FINDING THE DEFECT TRIVIAL (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF TURNED RIGHT INTO DEFENDANT DRIVER’S PATH AT AN INTERSECTION, DEFENDANT DRIVER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM FAULT AND DEFENDANT TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FOLIAGE OBSTRUCTING A STOP SIGN DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACCIDENT, DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Court Does Not Have the Power to Determine Whether Arbitrator Misinterpreted Collective Bargaining Agreement/Court Can Not Review Merits of Arbitrator’s Determination

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENDANT, A PODIATRIST, USING ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE (OZONE THERAPY), TREATED... PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS USING HIS OWN LADDER WHEN IT SLID CAUSING HIM TO FALL, WAS...