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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT COMPLETED HIS SENTENCE HE IS ENTITLED TO A DETERMINATION WHETHER HE SHOULD BE ADJUDICATED A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER; THE ORDER OF PROTECTION EXCEEDED THE STATUTORY TIME LIMIT (SECOND DEPT).

Although defendant had already completed his sentence, the Second Department held he was entitled to a determination whether he should be adjudicated a youthful offender, even if that relief was not requested. In addition, the Second Department noted the order of protection exceeded the maximum time allowed in the Criminal Procedure Law and did not take into account defendant’s jail-time:

In People v Rudolph (21 NY3d 497, 499), the Court of Appeals held that compliance with CPL 720.20(1), which provides that the sentencing court “must” determine whether an eligible defendant is to be treated as a youthful offender, “cannot be dispensed with, even where defendant has failed to ask to be treated as a youthful offender, or has purported to waive his or her right to make such a request.” Compliance with CPL 720.20(1) requires the sentencing court to actually consider and make an independent determination of whether an eligible youth is entitled to youthful offender treatment … .

Here, the record does not demonstrate that the Supreme Court considered whether to adjudicate the defendant a youthful offender. “Generally, under such circumstances, the sentence is vacated, and the matter remitted to the sentencing court for resentencing after determining whether the defendant should be treated as a youthful offender”… . However, in this case, the defendant has served his sentences. Under these circumstances, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, to determine whether the defendant should be afforded youthful offender treatment and thereafter submit a report to this Court advising of its determination, and hold the appeals in abeyance in the interim … . People v Shehi, 2020 NY Slip Op 03676, Second Dept 7-1-20

 

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