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WARRANTLESS MANUAL SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S IPAD AT JFK AIRPORT PROPER; CRITERIA FOR SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES AT BORDERS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s iPad was properly searched by a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agent at JFK airport after defendant, an airline pilot, had flown from Montreal to JFK.  Based upon an investigation in Texas, DHS believed defendant may have had child pornography on his iPad. Defendant was asked to provide the password after he was told the iPad would be seized if he did not provide the password. Defendant provided the password and child pornography was found:

Because “[t]he Government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border,” and “the expectation of privacy is less at the border than it is in the interior”… , border searches are generally deemed reasonable “simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border” … . Thus, “[r]outine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant” … . However, “highly intrusive searches” may require reasonable suspicion in light of the significance of the individual “dignity and privacy interests” infringed … .

While federal circuit courts are split as to whether reasonable suspicion or something less than that is required to justify a manual search of an electronic device for contraband at the border, no court has required a warrant or probable cause for either a manual or forensic search of an electronic device for contraband at the border … . Even assuming reasonable suspicion was required, here, the DHS Agents possessed reasonable suspicion to search the defendant’s iPad for child pornography … . …

Further, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the defendant was not coerced into entering the password to unlock his iPad, in violation of his right against self-incrimination, his right to due process, or CPL 60.45. The defendant, who was told that he was free to leave, was not in custody when he was asked to enter the password … . The fact that the defendant’s iPad would be detained if he did not enter the password did not mean that he was “subjected to the coercive atmosphere of a custodial confinement”… . Further, since the DHS Agents had reasonable suspicion that contraband could be found on the iPad, the Agents could perform a forensic search of the iPad without a warrant … . People v Perkins, 2020 NY Slip Op 03425, Second Dept 6-17-20

 

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