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Default Judgment of Foreclosure Cannot Be Collaterally Attacked in a Plenary Proceeding/Former Property Owner Cannot Contest Sale of Property After Default Judgment of Foreclosure

The Second Department noted that petitioner, Amona, could not bring a plenary action (an Article 78/declaratory judgment proceeding) after a tax foreclosure proceeding in which she defaulted and which resulted in the sale of her property.  Amona's only recourse was a motion to vacate the judgment of foreclosure.  However, Amona's default in the foreclosure action precluded any action to contest the sale of the property:

The Supreme Court properly granted the Conservancy's motion, in effect, to dismiss the petition/complaint. The relief sought herein by Amona should have been pursued by way of a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to CPLR 317 or CPLR 5015(a) in the in rem tax lien foreclosure proceeding … . “A plenary action or proceeding for such relief does not lie and must be dismissed” … . Since Amona has improperly sought to collaterally attack the judgment by way of this proceeding/action, the Supreme Court properly, in effect, dismissed the proceeding/action.

Moreover, Amona's default in the foreclosure action forever barred and foreclosed her of “all right, title, and interest and equity of redemption in and to the parcel” in which she had had an interest (RPTL 1131). Thus, Amona has no standing to contest the County's sale of the property … (see RPTL 1136[3]…).  Matter of Amona v County of Orange, 2014 NY Slip Op 09125, 2nd Dept 12-31-14

 

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