FEDERAL CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL MARINE INTERDICTION AGENT IS NOT A PEACE OFFICER UNDER NEW YORK LAW; THEREFORE THE AGENT MADE A VALID CITIZEN’S ARREST OF AN ERRATIC DRIVER HE OBSERVED WHILE ON THE HIGHWAY; MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE WEAPON FOUND IN DEFENDANT’S CAR SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Feinman, reversing the Appellate Division, over a dissent, determined the federal marine interdiction agent with US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was not a peace officer under New York law and, therefore, could effect a citizen’s arrest. The federal agent observed defendant driving erratically and putting other drivers in danger so he activated his emergency lights and pulled the driver over. The agent stayed in his vehicle and called the Buffalo police. After the Buffalo police arrived, the agent left. The police found a weapon in defendant’s car and he was charged with criminal possession of a weapon. Supreme Court granted defendant’s motion to suppress and the Fourth Department affirmed. Both courts relied on People v Williams (4 NY3d 535 [2005]) which held that peace officers could not make a citizen’s arrest. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Williams did not control because the federal agent in this case was not a peace officer under the relevant New York statutory definitions and therefore could make a citizen’s arrest:

Because the agent who stopped defendant in this case is not considered a federal law enforcement officer with peace officer powers pursuant to CPL 2.10 and 2.15, he could not have improperly circumvented the jurisdictional limitations on the powers reserved for those members of law enforcement under CPL 140.25, as the peace officers in Williams did. In other words, the agent’s conduct here did not violate the Legislature’s prescribed limits on a peace officer’s arrest powers because he is not, in fact, a peace officer. …

… [A]side from the clear limits as to the justifiable use of physical force that may be applied during an arrest by a private citizen (CPL 35.30 [4]; CPL 140.35 [3]), as well as the requirement that “[s]uch person must inform the person whom he [or she] is arresting of the reason for such arrest unless he [or she] encounters physical resistance, flight or other factors rendering such procedure impractical” (CPL 140.35 [2]), nothing in the citizen’s arrest statutes themselves set forth the methods that must be employed when, as here, a crime is committed in the responding citizen’s presence (see CPL 140.30, 140.40 …). We reiterate that whether this stop comported with constitutional principles or the express terms of the arrest statutes is simply not before us, as defendant failed to raise any such arguments before the suppression court. People v Page, 2020 NY Slip Op 03265, CtApp 6-11-20