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Village Properly Withdrew Its Defense and Indemnification of Officials When Officials Refused a Reasonable Settlement Offer

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Lippman (with a dissent), determined “that a municipality, consistent with its obligations under Public Officers Law, may withdraw its defense and indemnification of current and former municipal officials and officers in a civil action for their failure to accept a reasonable settlement offer, and that First Amendment concerns with respect to the settlement’s nondisclosure clause do not warrant a different conclusion:”

The Freeport Village Code § 130-6 adopts Public Officers Law § 18 (3)(a), which provides that “public entity shall provide for the defense of [an] employee in any civil action or proceeding, state or federal, arising out of any alleged act or omission which occurred or allegedly occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of his public employment or duties.”  The Village’s duty to defend and indemnify “shall be conditioned upon: . . . the full cooperation of the employee in the defense of such action or proceeding against the Village based upon the same act or omission” (Freeport Vil. Code § 130-6 [A][1] [emphasis added]; Public Officers Law § 18 [5][ii]). * * *

A municipal employer’s statutory duty to defend a public officer under Public Officers Law § 18 is similar to an insurance company’s contractual duty to defend an insured (Matter of Dreyer v City of Saratoga Springs, 43 AD3d 586, 588 [3d Dept 2007]).  As in the insurance context, petitioners were obligated to cooperate in the defense of the action as a condition of their defense and indemnification (Public Officers Law § 18 [5][ii]; Freeport Vil. Code § 130-6 [A][1]).

“In order to disclaim coverage on the ground of an insured’s lack of cooperation, the carrier must demonstrate that (1) it acted diligently in seeking to bring about the insured’s cooperation, (2) the efforts employed by the carrier were reasonably calculated to obtain the insured’s cooperation, and (3) the attitude of the insured, after cooperation was sought, was one of willful and avowed obstruction”… . Matter of Lancaster v Incorporated Village of Freeport…, 181, CtApp 11-19-13

 

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