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In Cases Not Involving Death or Bodily Injury Arising from an Accident, Whether a Notice of Disclaimer is Timely Is Governed by Common Law Waiver and Estoppel Principles, Not by the Provisions of Insurance law 3420

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, determined that the requirement that a disclaimer of coverage be made “as soon as reasonably possible after first learning of the … grounds for disclaimer” did not apply in a case involving coverage for the clean up of environmental contamination.  The Court explained that the “as soon as reasonably possible” language comes from Insurance Law 3420 and applies only to coverage for death or bodily injury arising from accidents:

By its plain terms, section 3420 (d) (2) applies only in a particular context: insurance cases involving death and bodily injury claims arising out of a New York accident and brought under a New York liability policy … . “Where, as here, the underlying claim does not arise out of an accident involving bodily injury or death, the notice of disclaimer provisions set forth in Insurance Law § 3420 (d) are inapplicable” … . In such cases, the insurer will not be barred from disclaiming coverage “simply as a result of the passage of time,” and its delay in giving notice of disclaimer should be considered under common-law waiver and/or estoppel principles… . KeySpan Gas E Corp v Munich Reins Am Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 04113, CtApp 6-10-14

 

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