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UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW A CONTRACT WITH MUTUAL CANCELLATION CLAUSES IS VALID; THEREFORE THE CANCELLATION BY DEFENDANT WAS NOT A BREACH OF THE CONTRACT OR THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the contract, which required the application of California law, and which included mutual cancellation clauses, was valid. Therefore cancellation by the defendant was not a breach of the contract or the covenant of good faith:

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the terms of the agreement in this case expressly permitted cancellation by either party during the initial one-year term, and the complaint therefore fails to state a viable cause of action for breach of contract. Pursuant to California law, contracts with mutual cancellation provisions are not illusory … , and contracts that provide for a fixed duration but that also contain an express clause for termination at will are not inconsistent … . …

… [T]he cause of action alleging anticipatory breach seeks damages for losses allegedly arising from the defendant’s failure to renew the term of the agreement. However, since the defendant properly cancelled the agreement during the initial term, there can be no recovery for anticipatory breach of contract based on any subsequent nonrenewal … . …

“It is universally recognized the scope of conduct prohibited by the covenant of good faith is circumscribed by the purposes and express terms of the contract” … , and the Supreme Court of California has noted that it is “aware of no reported case in which a court has held the covenant of good faith may be read to prohibit a party from doing that which is expressly permitted by an agreement” … . A.D.E. Sys., Inc. v Energy Labs, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 02911, Second Dept 5-20-20

 

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PARTY WHICH PURCHASED THE PROPERTY AFTER FORECLOSURE WAS COMMENCED WAS ENTITLED TO INTERVENE IN THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS BUT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO ALLEGE PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT COMPLY WITH NOTICE REQUIREMENTS; THE ESTATE OF THE ORIGINAL BORROWER IS NOT A NECESSARY PARTY (SECOND DEPT).
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