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PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE NUISANCE EXPLAINED; BECAUSE DEFENDANTS SOLD THEIR PROPERTY, THE APPEAL RELATED TO THE INJUNCTION CAUSE OF ACTION WAS MOOT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined plaintiffs’ private nuisance cause of action should not have been dismissed, but the public nuisance cause of action was properly dismissed. The Third Department noted that, because defendants’ property had been sold, the injunction aspect of the case was moot. The defendants had put in a parking area and a retaining wall which plaintiffs’ alleged blocked their view of oncoming traffic making it dangerous for plaintiffs’ to pull out from their driveway:

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that defendants paved a significant area of their front yard and proceeded to park cars and trucks thereon, and, as a result, their view of oncoming traffic was significantly hindered when they used their driveway. As a consequence, they claimed that they suffered great anxiety, as they continually worried about being in a traffic accident. What plaintiffs can ultimately prove, or whether damages of this sort are recoverable, is not our concern when determining a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action … . Rather, “the dispositive inquiry is whether plaintiffs have a cause of action and not whether one has been stated, i.e., whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” … . Here, after applying the strict standards of a pre-answer motion to dismiss, we conclude that Supreme Court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ cause of action for private nuisance.

… “A public nuisance is actionable by a private person only if it is shown that the person suffered special injury beyond that suffered by the community at large” … . Plaintiffs have not alleged that defendants interfered with the use of a public place or public rights. The complaint alleges that plaintiffs and the public (pedestrian, cyclist or motorist) are at risk of suffering a collision. “[W]here the claimed injury is common to the entire community, a private right of action is barred” … . Moreover, we find without merit plaintiffs’ claim that they suffer a special damage in that they will suffer liability as a result of any collision that might occur. Even were we to conclude that this claim is not completely speculative, the injury proposed by plaintiffs is not different in kind, but merely in degree, to that which may be suffered by the public as a whole. As such, it does not qualify as a “special injury” so as to allow plaintiffs to bring a public nuisance cause of action … . Duffy v Baldwin, 2020 NY Slip Op 02836, Third Dept 5-14-20

 

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