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ALTHOUGH PETITIONER WAS ADJUDICATED A LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDER AFTER HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON ON A PRIOR RAPE CONVICTION, HE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS OF THE SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM ACT AFTER HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON ON A SUBSEQUENT ROBBERY/BURGLARY CONVICTION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner, who was adjudicated a level three sex offender when released after a prior rape conviction, was not subject to the residential restrictions under the Sexual Assault Reform Act (Executive Law § 259-c (14)) upon release after his subsequent robbery/burglary convictions and incarceration:

In 2007, petitioner was convicted of robbery in the second degree and burglary in the third degree, resulting in a sentence of concurrent prison terms, the maximum of which was 13 years in prison, followed by five years of postrelease supervision. In 2017, petitioner reached the conditional release date of that sentence and the Board of Parole determined that, because he was a risk level three sex offender as a result of his 1989 conviction, he was subject to the provisions of the Sexual Assault Reform Act as set forth in Executive Law § 259-c (14) (L 2000, ch 1, as amended by L 2005, ch 544), which, as relevant here, prohibits him from residing within 1,000 feet of school grounds. Petitioner failed to offer any proposed residence that would permit him to comply with that condition, other than the New York City homeless shelter system, which the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision regarded as inappropriate. As such, petitioner was maintained in the custody of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. …

For the reasons stated in People ex rel. Negron v Superintendent, Woodbourne Corr. Facility (170 AD3d 12 [2019]), we agree with petitioner and find that he is not subject to the conditions of Executive Law § 259-c (14) (see Matter of Cajigas v Stanford, 169 AD3d 1168 [2019] … . Matter of Green v LaClair, 2020 NY Slip Op 02338, Third Dept 4-23-20

 

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