You are here: / / ALTHOUGH PETITIONER WAS ADJUDICATED A LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDER AFTER HIS...
,

ALTHOUGH PETITIONER WAS ADJUDICATED A LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDER AFTER HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON ON A PRIOR RAPE CONVICTION, HE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS OF THE SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM ACT AFTER HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON ON A SUBSEQUENT ROBBERY/BURGLARY CONVICTION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner, who was adjudicated a level three sex offender when released after a prior rape conviction, was not subject to the residential restrictions under the Sexual Assault Reform Act (Executive Law § 259-c (14)) upon release after his subsequent robbery/burglary convictions and incarceration:

In 2007, petitioner was convicted of robbery in the second degree and burglary in the third degree, resulting in a sentence of concurrent prison terms, the maximum of which was 13 years in prison, followed by five years of postrelease supervision. In 2017, petitioner reached the conditional release date of that sentence and the Board of Parole determined that, because he was a risk level three sex offender as a result of his 1989 conviction, he was subject to the provisions of the Sexual Assault Reform Act as set forth in Executive Law § 259-c (14) (L 2000, ch 1, as amended by L 2005, ch 544), which, as relevant here, prohibits him from residing within 1,000 feet of school grounds. Petitioner failed to offer any proposed residence that would permit him to comply with that condition, other than the New York City homeless shelter system, which the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision regarded as inappropriate. As such, petitioner was maintained in the custody of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. …

For the reasons stated in People ex rel. Negron v Superintendent, Woodbourne Corr. Facility (170 AD3d 12 [2019]), we agree with petitioner and find that he is not subject to the conditions of Executive Law § 259-c (14) (see Matter of Cajigas v Stanford, 169 AD3d 1168 [2019] … . Matter of Green v LaClair, 2020 NY Slip Op 02338, Third Dept 4-23-20

 

You might also like
Tutors Are Employees Entitled to Unemployment Insurance
DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH PREDATORY SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST A CHILD, A CLASS A-II FELONY PUNISHABLE BY A MANDATORY MAXIMUM TERM OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT; PURSUANT TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 195.10[1][B] DEFENDANT CANNOT WAIVE INDICTMENT AND PLEAD TO A SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION (SCI) (THIRD DEPT). ​
THE WIFE’S TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE ARREARS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CALCULATED FROM THE DATE OF THE WIFE’S APPLICATION FOR MAINTENANCE, NOT THE PRIOR DATE WHEN SHE BECAME UNEMPLOYED (THIRD DEPT).
NO EVIDENCE OF THREATENED USE OF A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT, ROBBERY FIRST CONVICTION NOT SUPPORTED, COUNTY COURT DID NOT CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY INTO DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REQUEST TO WITHDRAW, CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).
Question of Fact Whether Nonowner Occupied and Controlled Premises Where Plaintiff Fell
MORTGAGE COMPANY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION TO SEEK EQUITABLE SUBROGATION TO THE WIFE’S INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, CRITERIA FOR AMENDING A COMPLAINT, RATIFICATION OF THE EXECUTION OF A MORTGAGE, AND EQUITABLE SUBROGATION EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).
Misbehavior Report Did Not Supply Sufficient Notice of Alleged Offense
COVID STIMULUS PAYMENTS WERE ADVANCE TAX REFUNDS MEASURED BY THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN, NOT PAYMENTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE CHILDREN; THEREFORE THE PAYMENTS WERE SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION IN THIS DIVORCE PROCEEDING AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO MOTHER AS CHILD SUPPORT (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE RECORD DID NOT INDICATE THE HEARING OFFICER ASSESSED THE RELIABILITY OF... DEFENDANTS-ATTORNEYS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION BASED...