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Motion to Dismiss In Which Documentary Evidence Was Submitted—Court’s Role Is to Determine Whether Plaintiff Has a Cause of Action, Not Whether Plaintiff Has Stated a Cause of Action—Although the Complaint Alleged Interference With a Competitive Bidding Process Involving Public Entities, the Case Fit an Exception to the Rule that Competitive Bidding Issues Be Determined in an Article 78 Proceeding—It Was Alleged a Private Party (Defendant) Interfered with the Competitive Bidding Process

Reversing Supreme Court, the Third Department determined plaintiff had adequately pled a cause of action for tortious interference with contract. The plaintiff alleged that defendant subverted a bidding process for the installation of artificial turf at state and local schools. Usually competitive bidding cases are brought in an Article 78 proceeding against the relevant public entity. This case fit an exception to that rule because it was brought against a private party working with the public entities. There was also some question whether the proceeding was a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action or a motion for summary judgment.  Because documentary evidence was submitted, the court’s role was to determine whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether plaintiff has stated one:

…[S]ince the motion (made shortly after serving the answer and before disclosure) argued an absence of any legal viability of the alleged causes of action, Supreme Court did not err in treating the motion as a narrowly framed post-answer CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ground asserted in a summary judgment motion … . When dismissal is sought for failure to state a cause of action and, as here, plaintiff submits affidavits, “a court may freely consider [those] affidavits . . . and ‘the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] has stated one'” … .

Turning to the merits of the motion, “the laws requiring competitive bidding were designed to benefit taxpayers rather than corporate bidders and, thus, should be construed and administered with sole reference to the public interest” … . Therefore, the remedy for an alleged violation of the competitive bidding statutes typically involves a timely CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the bidding process … . However, a narrow exception to the limited remedy may exist where a plaintiff does not seek relief from the public entity, but brings an action against someone working on behalf of the public entity in the competitive bidding process who allegedly engaged in egregious conduct unknown to the public entity aimed at intentionally subverting a fair process … . Allegations of restricting competition to artificial turf manufactured by A-Turf could be part of a cognizable claim under the narrow exception … . Chenango Contr., Inc. v Hughes Assoc., 2015 NY Slip Op 03903, 3rd Dept 5-7-15

 

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