You are here: / / THE “FALSELY REPORTING AN INCIDENT” STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL...
,

THE “FALSELY REPORTING AN INCIDENT” STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO DEFENDANT’S FALSE TWEETS ALLEGING A RACIALLY-MOTIVATED ASSAULT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s “falsely reporting an incident” conviction, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, determined defendant’s tweets were protected by the First Amendment. Defendant was accused of falsely tweeting she was the victim of a racially-motivated assault:

… [A]lthough it was “not unlikely” that defendant’s false tweets about a racial assault at a state university would cause public alarm (Penal Law § 240.50 [1]), what level of public alarm rises to the level of criminal liability? Indeed, United States v Alvarez (567 US at 734 [Breyer, J., concurring]) informs us that criminalizing false speech requires either proof of specific harm to identifiable victims or a great likelihood of harm. Certainly, general concern by those reading defendant’s tweets does not rise to that level, nor does the proof adduced at trial, which established that defendant’s tweets were “retweeted” a significant number of times. In fact, because these “retweets” led to nothing more than a charged online discussion about whether a racially motivated assault did in fact occur, which falls far short of meeting the standard set forth in United States v Alvarez (567 US at 734 [Breyer, J., concurring]), we reach the inescapable conclusion that Penal Law § 240.50 (1), as applied to defendant’s conduct, is unconstitutional. …

… “[T]he remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true” (United States v Alvarez, 567 US at 727) and “social media platforms are information-disseminating fora. By the very nature of social media, falsehoods can quickly and effectively be countered by truth, making the criminalizing of false speech on social media not ‘actually necessary’ to prevent alarm and inconvenience” … . This could not be more apparent here, where defendant’s false tweets were largely debunked through counter speech; thus, criminalizing her speech by way of Penal Law § 240.50 (1) was not actually necessary to prevent public alarm and inconvenience … . People v Burwell, 2020 NY Slip Op 02205, Third Dept 4-9-20

 

You might also like
Workers’ Compensation Carrier Which Consents to Settlement of Third Party Action Is Entitled to Exercise Its Credit Against the Settlement-Recovery Upon Its Consent
COMPLAINT INCLUDED ACTIONABLE DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL WHO MADE THE STATEMENTS IN A LETTER TO TOWN OFFICIALS, TOWN OFFICIALS ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE OR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.
PLAINTIFFS’ ACTION STEMMING FROM PFOA CONTAMINATION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION DID NOT APPLY; QUESTIONS OF FACT RAISED ABOUT THE DUTY OF CARE, PROXIMATE CAUSE, PRIVATE NUISANCE, TRESPASS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES (THIRD DEPT).
AFTER TERMINATION OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS PLAINTIFF CANNOT SUE ON INVOICES NOT INCLUDED IN THE SCHEDULE OF ASSETS.
POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA CONSTITUTED DISQUALIFYING MISCONDUCT.
THE EDUCATION LAW PERMITS, BUT DOES NOT REQUIRE, SCHOOL DISTRICTS TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION TO STUDENTS ATTENDING NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS WHEN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS ARE NOT IN SESSION (THIRD DEPT). ​
ALTHOUGH PETITIONER’S USING HIS CELL PHONE WHILE ON DUTY TO SEND EXPLICIT MESSAGES VIOLATED THE EMPLOYEE’S MANUAL AND WARRANTED PUNISHMENT, TERMINATION WAS TOO SEVERE A PENALTY (THIRD DEPT).
THE UNAVAILABILIITY OF PARKING FOR WORK REQUIRED THAT CLAIMANT CROSS A DANGEROUS ROAD TO GET TO HIS WORKPLACE; THE INJURIES SUFFERED WHEN CLAIMANT WAS STRUCK BY A VEHICLE WERE THEREFORE COMPENSABLE (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

Copyright © 2023 New York Appellate Digest, LLC
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

EVIDENCE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND MARIJUANA USE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND THAT... A PART-TIME COLLEGE INSTRUCTOR SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS...