You are here: / / PROTECTIVE ORDER VACATED UPON EXPEDITED REVIEW (SECOND DEPT).

PROTECTIVE ORDER VACATED UPON EXPEDITED REVIEW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating the protective order issued by Supreme Court, determined defense counsel should have been heard in opposition to the application for the protective order:

… [T]he matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, to afford the defendant an opportunity to make arguments to that court with respect to the People’s application for a protective order.

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court should have granted defense counsel’s request for an opportunity to be heard with respect to the People’s application for a protective order pursuant to CPL 245.70 … . … [T]he People advised this Court that they no longer oppose the application. People v Belfon, 2020 NY Slip Op 00519, Second Dept 1-27-20

 

You might also like
Agency’s Failure to Follow Its Own Regulations Renders Determination Arbitrary and Capricious
IN REINSTATING THE ACTION AFTER VACATING THE ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS’, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT EXPLAINED WHAT SHOULD BE ALLEGED IN A COMPLAINT FOR LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT). ​
HERE PLAINTIFF BROUGHT SUIT AGAINST A SCHOOL DISTRICT PURSUANT TO THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT ALLEGING THE SCHOOL DISTRICT NEGLIGENTLY FAILED TO PROTECT HER FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT BY A FELLOW STUDENT; THE FACT THAT THE STUDENT COULD NOT BE CRIMINALLY PROSECUTED FOR THE ASSAULT BECAUSE OF HIS AGE DID NOT PRECLUDE REVIVAL OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE SCHOOL DISTRICT; IN OTHER WORDS THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT APPLIES TO REVIVE NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION EVEN IF THE UNDERLYING SEXUAL ASSAULT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN PROSECUTED (SECOND DEPT).
INSURED’S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH INSURER RELIEVED INSURER OF LIABILITY FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST THE INSURED.
MIDDLE DRIVER WAS PUSHED INTO PLAINTIFF’S CAR BY THE DRIVER BEHIND, MIDDLE DRIVER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
A PLAINTIFF FACED WITH A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION NEED NOT SUBMIT ANY EVIDENCE OR AFFIDAVITS IN OPPOSITION BUT RATHER CAN STAND ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).
THE DISSENT IN THIS PERSISTENT VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER CASE ARGUED THE 34-YEAR SENTENCE FOR THE 34-YEAR-OLD DEFENDANT WAS HARSH AND EXCESSIVE, NOTING THAT THE BURGLARIES WERE IN THE DAYTIME WHEN NO ONE WAS HOME (SECOND DEPT).
MAILING THE NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE TO BOTH BORROWERS IN THE SAME ENVELOPE IS A VIOLATION OF RPAPL 1304 REQUIRING DENIAL OF THE BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

SUPREME COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING A PROTECTIVE ORDER ALLOWING... THE INTERIM DECISION ISSUED BY SUPREME COURT WAS NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF AN ORDER;...