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PARTY WHICH PURCHASED THE PROPERTY AFTER FORECLOSURE WAS COMMENCED WAS ENTITLED TO INTERVENE IN THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS BUT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO ALLEGE PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT COMPLY WITH NOTICE REQUIREMENTS; THE ESTATE OF THE ORIGINAL BORROWER IS NOT A NECESSARY PARTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the party (appellant) which purchased the property after foreclosure was commenced should have been allowed to intervene in the foreclosure proceedings. The Second Department further determined the estate of the original borrower was not a necessary party, the appellant did not have standing to allege plaintiff bank’s noncompliance with the notice requirements of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1304 and plaintiff’s failure to serve a notice of default:

On September 10, 2015, the plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose a mortgage on premises owned by the defendant Shawn A. Carrington. Carrington failed to answer the complaint. On March 23, 2016, Carrington sold the premises to the appellant 1698 Management Corp. …

The appellant was entitled to intervene as of right pursuant to CPLR 1012(a) since it established that the representation of its interest by the parties would be inadequate, that the action involved the disposition of title to real property, and that it would be bound and adversely affected by a judgment of foreclosure and sale … . Contrary to the court’s determination, the appellant was not limited to continuing the action in Carrington’s name pursuant to CPLR 1018. The fact that the appellant obtained its interest in the premises after the action was commenced and the notice of pendency was filed does not definitively bar intervention … , nor does the fact that Carrington defaulted in answering the complaint … . Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case, the appellant’s motion, made less than five months after it purchased the premises, and before an order of reference was issued, was timely … . US Bank N.A. v Carrington, 2020 NY Slip Op 00173, Second Dept 1-8-20

 

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