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Causes of Action Seeking Monetary Damages Were Not Incidental to the Article 78 Causes of Action and, Therefore, Were Not Subject to the Four-Month Statute of Limitations

The Second Department determined certain causes of action in plaintiffs’ complaint should not have been dismissed because they were not incidental to the Article 78 causes of action which were time-barred.  Plaintiffs brought a hybrid proceeding (1) to annul a town resolution assessing taxes to pay for the town’s demolition of some of plaintiffs’ property which was deemed unsafe, and (2) seeking damages for destruction of property and interruption of plaintiffs’ business. The Second Department explained the criteria for determining whether causes of action seeking monetary damages should be deemed incidental to the Article 78 causes of action (and therefore subject to the four-month statute of limitations):

Pursuant to CPLR 7806, where a CPLR article 78 petitioner seeks damages as well as the annulment of a governmental determination, “[a]ny restitution or damages granted to the petitioner must be incidental to the primary relief sought by the petitioner, and must be such as he [or she] might otherwise recover on the same set of facts in a separate action or proceeding suable in the supreme court against the same body or officer in its or his official capacity” (CPLR 7806). “[W]here the thrust of the lawsuit is the review of an adverse . . . agency determination, with the monetary relief incidental, [the] Supreme Court may entertain the entire case under CPLR article 78” … . “Whether the essential nature of the claim is to recover money, or whether the monetary relief is incidental to the primary claim, is dependent upon the facts and issues presented in a particular case” … . Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the claims asserted in the first, second, and eighth causes of action were not incidental to the plaintiffs’ CPLR article 78 challenges to the Resolution and the special tax assessment … . Therefore, these causes of action were not asserted in connection with the CPLR article 78 portion of this hybrid action/proceeding, and were not barred by the four-month statute of limitations applicable to CPLR article 78 proceedings … . Hertzel v Town of Putnam Val., 2015 NY Slip Op 06708, 2nd Dept 9-2-15

 

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