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THE CRITERIA FOR PRE-ANSWER DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT BASED UPON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUDICIAL ECONOMY WERE NOT MET (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant’s pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint alleging the breach of a letter of intent (LOI) should not have been granted. The evidence submitted by the defendant was not “documentary” evidence within the meaning of CPLR 3211 and the defendant did not demonstrate the complaint should be dismissed in the interest of judicial economy:

… [T]he emails and the unsigned documents relied on by the Supreme Court to conclude that the LOI was an unenforceable agreement to agree were not essentially undeniable, and did not constitute documentary evidence … . Furthermore, the LOI itself contained all the essential elements of a lease, including the area to be leased, the duration of the lease, and the price to be paid … . Moreover, nothing in the LOI stated that it was not binding, and its language did not conclusively establish that the parties did not intend to be bound by it … . Accordingly, the court should have denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss the complaint.

… A court is permitted to consider evidentiary material submitted by a defendant in support of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and then the question becomes whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not simply whether a cause of action is stated … . Unless the defendant can demonstrate that there is no factual issue as claimed by the plaintiff, the motion to dismiss should be denied … . Here, the defendant failed to demonstrate that there was no factual issue regarding whether the LOI can be construed as a binding contract. Accordingly, that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) should have been denied. S & J Serv. Ctr., Inc. v Commerce Commercial Group, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 09049, Second Dept 12-18-19

 

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