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ROPE WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO FALL WAS AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION KNOWN TO THE PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the rope (connected to a tree and a metal stanchion in a building atrium) which caused plaintiff to trip and fall was a non-actionable open and obvious condition:

[Defendant] moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, arguing that the subject metal stanchions and connecting rope were open and obvious, and not inherently dangerous. The Supreme Court denied [defendant’s] motion.

[Defendant] met its prima facie burden by showing that the subject rope and stanchions, which were known to the plaintiff, were open and obvious, and not inherently dangerous … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact… . LeComples v More Specialized Transp., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 07298, 2nd Dept 11-9-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (ROPE WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO FALL WAS AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION KNOWN THE PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SLIP AND FALL (ROPE WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO FALL WAS AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION KNOWN THE PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/OPEN AND OBVIOUS (ROPE WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO FALL WAS AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION KNOWN THE PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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