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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DETERMINED THE MERITS OF THIS ACTION FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ON A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to dismiss a declaratory judgment action should have been denied. Supreme Court had issued a declaratory judgment in favor of the moving party (the county). This is a class action contending that the imposition of a driver responsibility fee on red-light camera violations is illegal:

The plaintiff commenced this putative class action against Nassau County and the Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency (hereinafter together the County) seeking, inter alia, a judgment declaring that the imposition of a driver responsibility fee on a red-light camera violation is “inconsistent with New York’s general law, or is otherwise ultra vires, preempted, unconstitutional, or void as a matter of law.” Prior to interposing an answer, the County moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The Supreme Court, treating that branch of the County’s motion as one for a declaration in the County’s favor with respect to the first cause of action, granted that branch of the motion to the extent of declaring that the imposition of a driver responsibility fee on a red-light camera violation was a proper exercise of the County’s power to charge and collect administrative fees and, based on that declaration, directed dismissal of the remainder of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. We reverse. …

“… [I]f the record before the motion court is insufficient to resolve all factual issues such as the rights of the parties cannot be determined as a matter of law, a declaration upon a motion to dismiss is not permissible” … . Guthart v Nassau County, 2019 NY Slip Op 08825, Second Dept 12-11-19

 

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