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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT MAY HAVE STOPPED AT A STOP SIGN, HE NEVERTHELESS FAILED TO YIELD; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS INTERSECTION TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment in this intersection traffic accident case. The fact that defendant (Maicol) allegedly stopped at a stop sign before pulling out into plaintiff’s path did not raise a question of fact:

… [T]he plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by demonstrating that Maicol’s negligence in failing to yield the right-of-way was a proximate cause of the accident (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1142[a]; 1172[a] … ). Moreover, the plaintiff’s case was buttressed by Maicol’s admission in the police report to the effect that he failed to see the plaintiff’s vehicle prior to the collision … . …

That Maicol stopped at the stop sign was not dispositive, as he nevertheless failed to yield … . The assertions in the defendants’ counsel’s affirmation that the plaintiff may have been speeding or negligent in failing to take evasive action were speculative … . In any event, to be entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability, a plaintiff is no longer required to show freedom from comparative fault in establishing his or her prima facie case … . Ashby v Estate of Encarnacion, 2019 NY Slip Op 08815, Second Dept 12-12-19

 

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