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BECAUSE THE B MISDEMEANOR CARRIES DEPORTATION AS A POTENTIAL PENALTY, DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department reversed defendant’s conviction based upon a recent Court of Appeals case which held a defendant charged with a misdemeanor which carries deportation as a potential penalty is entitled to a jury trial:

… [T]he defendant, a noncitizen, is entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution because the charged crime of attempted assault in the third degree, a class B misdemeanor, carries a potential penalty of deportation (see People v Suazo, 32 NY3d 491). We note that because People v Suazo was decided after this matter was argued but before it was decided, the change of the law set forth therein therefore applies to the defendant … . Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and grant a new trial. People v Ahsan, 2019 NY Slip Op 08571, Second Dept 11-27-19

 

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​REMOVING SCAFFOLDS, LADDERS, ETC. FROM THE WORKSITE WAS “ANCILLARY” TO THE RENOVATION WORK AND THEREFORE PROTECTED BY LABOR LAW 240(1); THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S FALLING OFF THE TOP OF THE VAN WHERE HE WAS LOADING THE EQUIPMENT WAS COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1) (SECOND DEPT).
SELLER’S ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AGREEMENT PROPERLY DISMISSED; THE CONTRACT WAS SUBJECT TO ATTORNEY APPROVAL BUT NO DEADLINE FOR ATTORNEY-APPROVAL WAS SET BY THE AGREEMENT; DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL INFORMED PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL THAT DEFENDANTS DID NOT WISH TO GO FORWARD WITH THE PURCHASE EITHER SEVEN OR NINE DAYS AFTER THE CONTRACT WAS EXECUTED, WHICH WAS DEEMED A REASONABLE TIME (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS INTERSECTION ACCIDENT CASE, WHETHER DEFENDANT STOPPED BEFORE ENTERING PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT OF WAY WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE.
THE 90-DAY TIME-LIMIT FOR FILING AND SERVING A NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST THE CITY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH RUNS FROM THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR; HERE THE NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS TIMELY FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH CAUSE OF ACTION; HOWEVER THE 90-DAY TIME-LIMIT FOR THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING AND PREIMPACT TERROR RUNS FROM THE DATE OF THE ACCIDENT; THE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN REJECTED AS UNTIMELY FOR THOSE TWO CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT GIVE COUNSEL MEANINGFUL NOTICE OF A SUBSTANTIVE JURY NOTE; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT). ​
IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION THE BANK MUST PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1306 WHICH REQUIRES PROOF PAPERS WERE FILED WITHIN THREE BUSINESS DAYS OF MAILING THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE OF DEFAULT; HERE THERE WAS NO PROOF WHEN THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE WAS MAILED, SO THE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1306 WAS INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT).

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