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FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY STAY TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION COMMENCED BEFORE THE STAY WENT INTO EFFECT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, over a three-judge dissent, determined an automatic bankruptcy stay tolls the statute of limitations where a party has a pending action at the time the stay was imposed:

New York law tolls the statute of limitations where “the commencement of an action has been stayed by a court or by statutory prohibition” (CPLR 204 [a]). Federal bankruptcy law automatically stays the commencement or continuation of any judicial proceedings against a debtor upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition (see 11 USC § 362 [a]). We must determine whether the bankruptcy stay qualifies as a “statutory prohibition” under CPLR 204 (a), and, if so, whether a party may later avail itself of the toll where, at the time the stay was imposed, that party had a pending action asserting the same claim. … [W]e answer yes to both questions … . * * *

CPLR 204 (a) provides, “[w]here the commencement of an action has been stayed by a court or by statutory prohibition, the duration of the stay is not a part of the time within which the action must be commenced.” The result here depends on our reading of the term “commencement.”

Plaintiff argues that it is impossible for defendant to have been prohibited from “commencing” an action because a foreclosure action had been commenced prior to plaintiff’s bankruptcy filing. Application of plaintiff’s rule would be as follows: Because defendant filed the first foreclosure claim and defendant responded by filing a bankruptcy petition, invoking the automatic stay, commencement of that first action was not “stayed” under the statute and the toll is inapplicable. And when defendant filed a second foreclosure action, and plaintiff again responded by again filing a bankruptcy petition that invoked the automatic stay, “commencement” of that second action was not stayed, once again making the toll inapplicable … . * * *

Neither this Court nor the Legislature has restricted the term “commencement” to the first time a party files a complaint asserting a cause of action; instead the term may also include the commencement of subsequent actions asserting the same claim … . Lubonty v U.S. Bank Natl. Assn.., 2019 NY Slip Op 08520, CtApp 11-25-19

 

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