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REPORTS BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S CONVICTION REVIEW UNIT (CRU) EXONERATING CONVICTED PERSONS ARE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL); AN EXONERATED PERSON MAY WAIVE THE SEALING REQUIREMENT (CPL 160.50) AND CONSENT TO DISCLOSURE OF A REPORT; THE RELEASED REPORT HERE IS SUBJECT TO REDACTION DETERMINED IN AN IN CAMERA REVIEW BY A JUDGE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Connolly, determined: (1) the redacted report of the District Attorney’s Conviction Review Unit (CRU) concerning the exoneration of Jabbar Washington was properly made available to the New York Times because Washington consented to the unsealing of the document (CPL 160.50(a)(d)); (2) absent such consent, the CRU reports are exempt from disclosure under FOIL; and (3) the redaction of the Washington report should be reviewed by a judge (in camera review):

CPL 160.50 does not define what constitutes an official record relating to an arrest or prosecution, and the Court of Appeals has held that “bright line rules are not wholly appropriate in this area” … . …

… [ T]he CRU’s final reports constitute official records created in connection with the arrest and prosecution of the persons whose convictions were ultimately vacated through the conviction review process. At the time the reports were created, the subjects of the reports stood convicted as the result of prosecutorial action. The reports are “official records” in that they were created by the DA’s office itself for the purpose of scrutinizing the propriety of each of the subject convictions. …

… [T]hat the CRU’s reports might serve a broader public purpose in leading to reform of police agencies or prosecutors’ offices, is not a basis to overlook the protections endowed by CPL 160.50 to the individuals exonerated through the CRU’s work. Matter of New York Times Co. v District Attorney of Kings County, 2019 NY Slip Op 08410, Second Dept 11-20-19

 

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