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INSTALLING WINDOW SHADES IS NOT ‘ALTERING’ WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND WAS NOT PART OF THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR’S RESPONSIBILITIES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that defendants’ motion for summary judgment  on the Labor Law 240 (1), 241 (6) and 200 causes of action should have been dismissed. Plaintiff’s work was not “altering” within the meaning of Labor Law 240 (1) and was not part of the general contractor’s (Greenlight’s) contract with the apartment owners (the Dixons):

Because plaintiff Martin Topoli’s work installing window shades at the time of the accident does not constitute “altering” within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1), that claim is dismissed …. The Labor Law § 241(6) claim is also dismissed, since plaintiff’s work is separate and distinct from the larger construction project … . Third-party defendants and apartment owners, Rebecca Dixon and Adam Dixon, modified the contract with general contractor Greenlight Construction Management Corp. to remove the provision and installation of window treatments from the scope of its work. The Dixons directly contracted with plaintiff’s employer for the installation of the window shades after the construction work was completed and they had moved in to the apartment. Greenlight’s return to the work site after the completion of construction, done to accommodate the Dixons’ new desire for larger window valances, was limited in nature and separate from plaintiff’s work. Topoli v 77 Bleecker St. Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 07537, First Dept 10-22-19

 

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