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WAIVER OF APPEAL ENCOMPASSES APPELLATE DIVISION’S INTEREST-OF-JUSTICE JURISDICTION, INCLUDING THE POWER TO REVIEW THE HARSHNESS OF AN AGREED SENTENCE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Tom, determined defendant’s waiver of appeal was valid, and included in the waiver was the Appellate Division’s interest-of-justice power to review the harshness of a negotiated sentence:

 

A defendant who has validly waived his right to appeal may not invoke this Court’s interest-of-justice jurisdiction to reduce a bargained-for sentence (Lopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256). “By pleading guilty and waiving the right to appeal, a defendant has forgone review of the terms of the plea, including harshness or excessiveness of the sentence” (id. at 256).

To be sure, as the Court of Appeals clarified in Lopez, the Appellate Division may be divested of its unique interest-of-justice jurisdiction only by constitutional amendment (6 NY3d at 255, citing People v Pollenz, 67 NY2d 264, 267-268 [1986]). However, as Lopez went on to hold, “a defendant is free to relinquish the right to invoke that authority and indeed does so by validly waiving the right to appeal” (id. at 256). People v Jenkins, 2016 NY Slip Op 01056, 1st Dept 2-11-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (WAIVER OF APPEAL ENCOMPASSES APPELLATE DIVISION’S INTEREST-OF-JUSTICE JURISDICTION, INCLUDING THE POWER TO REVIEW THE HARSHNESS OF AN AGREED SENTENCE)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL, WAIVER OF APPEAL ENCOMPASSES APPELLATE DIVISION’S INTEREST-OF-JUSTICE JURISDICTION, INCLUDING THE POWER TO REVIEW THE HARSHNESS OF AN AGREED SENTENCE)/INTEREST-OF-JUSTICE JURISDICTION (WAIVER OF APPEAL ENCOMPASSES APPELLATE DIVISION’S INTEREST-OF-JUSTICE JURISDICTION, INCLUDING THE POWER TO REVIEW THE HARSHNESS OF AN AGREED SENTENCE)

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