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CONDITION OF PAROLE THAT PETITIONER NEVER ENTER QUEENS COUNTY WITH NO PROVISION FOR OBTAINING PERMISSION TO TRAVEL THERE VIOLATED PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the condition of petitioner’s post release supervision prohibiting him from entering Queens County (where the assault victim resides), without any option to travel there with permission, violated petitioner’s right to travel and right to associate and was arbitrary and capricious:

Release conditions that implicate certain fundamental rights, such as the right to travel and the right to associate, have been held permissible as long as “reasonably related” to a petitioner’s criminal history and future chances of recidivism … .

The special condition, as noted, provides, “I will not leave New York City . . . [including Queens] without written permission from my parole officer (including work purposes). I understand that I am not to travel under any circumstances to the borough of Queens.” Barring petitioner from the entire county of Queens under all circumstances, without any clear right to seek, or ability to obtain, a waiver from respondents, is a categorical ban impinging upon his rights to travel and association, and, for this reason alone, the travel restriction must be vacated as arbitrary and capricious, as it is not “reasonably related” to petitioner’s criminal history and future chances of recidivism … .

Accordingly, we remand this matter for respondents to issue a new travel restriction. The restriction must be clear and “reasonably related” to petitioner’s criminal history and future chance of recidivism … . Unlike the vacated restriction, the new restriction should specify that any travel restrictions are subject to case-by-case exceptions for legitimate reasons, which petitioner may request from his parole officer. Matter of Cobb v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 2019 NY Slip Op 07480, First Dept 10-17-19

 

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