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THE BANK DID NOT SUBMIT PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE FILING REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1306 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the bank’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted because the bank did not submit proof of compliance with the filing requirements of RPAPL 1306:

Pursuant to RPAPL 1306, lenders “shall file with the superintendent of financial services . . . within three business days of the mailing of the notice required by [RPAPL 1304]” a form containing certain information regarding the borrower and the mortgage (RPAPL 1306[1]; see RPAPL 1306[2]). RPAPL 1306(1) further states that “[a]ny complaint served in [an action] initiated pursuant to [RPAPL article 13] shall contain, as a condition precedent to such [action], an affirmative allegation that at the time the [action] is commenced, the plaintiff has complied with the provisions of this section.”

Here, in support of its motion, the plaintiff failed to submit any evidence of compliance with RPAPL 1306. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Lyon, 2019 NY Slip Op 07060, Second Dept 10-2-19

 

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