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FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED, ALTHOUGH CPLR 210 (b) TOLLS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ACTION AGAINST AN ESTATE, THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT HUSBAND REPRESENTED HIS WIFE’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff’s foreclosure action was time-barred. Although the action would have been timely against the estate of defendant’s (Kess’s) wife because of the 18-month post-death statute of limitations toll in CPLR 210 (b), plaintiff did not demonstrate Kess was representing his wife’s estate:

…Kess demonstrated that the six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213[4]) began to run on May 6, 2008, when the plaintiff accelerated the mortgage debt and commenced the 2008 foreclosure action … . Since the plaintiff did not commence the instant foreclosure action until more than six years later, Kess sustained his initial burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that this action was untimely … . …

CPLR 210(b) provides that “[t]he period of eighteen months after the death . . . of a person against whom a cause of action exists is not a part of the time within which the action must be commenced against his [or her] executor or administrator.” The statute plainly is limited in scope to the executor or administrator of the decedent’s estate and does not extend to other defendants in the same action … . Consequently, CPLR 210(b) could not extend the statute of limitations period as to Kess individually. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to establish that Kess was the administrator or executor of his deceased wife’s estate, a point which Kess denied in reply to the plaintiff’s opposition. U.S. Bank, N.A. v Kess, 2018 NY Slip Op 01498, Second Dept 3-7-18

FORECLOSURE (FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED, ALTHOUGH CPLR 210 (b) TOLLS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ACTION AGAINST AN ESTATE, THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT HUSBAND REPRESENTED HIS WIFE’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED, ALTHOUGH CPLR 210 (b) TOLLS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ACTION AGAINST AN ESTATE, THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT HUSBAND REPRESENTED HIS WIFE’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT))/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (FORECLOSURE, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED, ALTHOUGH CPLR 210 (b) TOLLS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ACTION AGAINST AN ESTATE, THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT HUSBAND REPRESENTED HIS WIFE’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, ORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED, ALTHOUGH CPLR 210 (b) TOLLS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ACTION AGAINST AN ESTATE, THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT HUSBAND REPRESENTED HIS WIFE’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 210 (b)  (FORECLOSURE, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED, ALTHOUGH CPLR 210 (b) TOLLS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ACTION AGAINST AN ESTATE, THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT HUSBAND REPRESENTED HIS WIFE’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT))

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