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ALTHOUGH THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION INSPECTED THE VACANT PROPERTY AND MADE PERIODIC REPAIRS, IT WAS NOT A “MORTGAGEE IN POSSESSION” SUCH THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED; IN ORDER TO BE DEEMED A “MORTGAGEE IN POSSESSION,” THE MORTGAGOR MUST CONSENT TO THE BANK’S POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined the statute of limitations had run on defendant bank’s foreclosure counterclaim. The bank argued that the statute of limitations had been tolled because it was a “mortgagee in possession,” in that it kept tabs on the property and made repairs. The majority held that, in order to be a “mortgagee in possession,” the mortgagor must consent to the possession. Such consent constitutes an acknowledgment of the debt. The mortgagor here did not consent to the mortgagee’s possession of the property:

We disagree with our dissenting colleague that determining whether a mortgagee qualifies as a mortgagee in possession for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations requires “an analysis of the actions taken by the mortgagee to secure the property financially and physically.” Rather, the determination only requires an analysis of whether the mortgagee took full possession of the property pursuant to an agreement with the mortgagor. Mardenborough v U.S. Bank N.A., 2022 NY Slip Op 00034, Second Dept 1-5-22

 

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