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PLAINTIFF ALLEGED A NEW THEORY OF LIABILITY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ANSWER TO DEFENDANT DOCTOR’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION; SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED PLAINTIFF TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT AND BILL OF PARTICULARS TO REFLECT THE NEW THEORY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant doctor’s motion for summary judgment in this medical malpractice action should have been granted. Instead of answering the defendant’s expert opinion that the doctor’s actions were not the cause of the amniotic fluid embolism (AFE) which plaintiff alleged caused the death of plaintiff’s decedent, the plaintiff for the first time alleged the cause of death was septic shock, not AFE. Supreme Court erroneously denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment and allowed plaintiff to amend the complaint to allege the new theory:

… [T]he defendant met his prima facie burden as to proximate cause by submitting the affidavit of an expert in maternal fetal medicine, who opined that any delay in the decedent undergoing an abortion procedure from the second trimester to the third trimester did not cause her to develop AFE. In opposition, the plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of fact as to the defendant’s prima facie showing, but rather alleged, for the first time, a new theory of causation, claiming that the decedent died of septic shock, not AFE. “A plaintiff cannot, for the first time in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, raise a new or materially different theory of recovery against a party from those pleaded in the complaint and the bill of particulars” … . …

“[O]nce discovery has been completed and the case has been certified as ready for trial, [a] party will not be permitted to amend the bill of particulars except upon a showing of special and extraordinary circumstances” … . Here, the plaintiff failed to show special and extraordinary circumstances in seeking leave to amend the complaint and the bill of particulars in response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, three years after the commencement of the action and almost six months after the filing of the note of issue. The plaintiff offered no reasonable excuse for relying solely on the medical examiner’s report and for failing to explore his new theory of causation earlier in the proceedings … . Moreover, permitting the amendment at this late stage of the proceedings would prejudice the defendant. Anonymous v Gleason, 2019 NY Slip Op 06207, Second Dept 8-21-19

 

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