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THE PURPORTED REFORMATION OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT TO REDUCE COVERAGE AFTER THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT OCCURRED IS UNENFORCEABLE, THE INSURER IS LIABLE FOR THE ORIGINAL COVERAGE AMOUNT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the reformation of the insurance contract to reduce the bodily injury coverage limits from $250,000 to $80,000 was unenforceable because the change was made after the traffic accident occurred:

In December 2011, the plaintiff allegedly was injured when a vehicle in which he was a passenger was involved in a collision. At the time of the collision, the vehicle was driven by nonparty Douglas Giambrone and owned by nonparty Carol Giambrone (hereinafter together the Giambrones), and was insured by the defendant under a liability policy providing for bodily injury coverage up to $250,000 per person/$500,000 per occurrence. In May 2012, the plaintiff commenced an action against the Giambrones to recover damages for personal injuries he sustained in the accident. In August 2012, the defendant entered into an agreement with the Giambrones to reform the policy to reduce the bodily injury coverage to a single $80,000 limit. Thereafter, the Giambrones notified the plaintiff that the coverage limit applicable to the accident was $80,000. The plaintiff subsequently obtained a judgment against the Giambrones in the amount of $300,000 in the underlying personal injury action. …

An insurer may not retroactively reform a policy to reduce the stated bodily injury coverage limits after a loss caused by its insured occurs, even if the reduced limits still meet or exceed the statutory minimum (see Olivio v Government Empls. Ins. Co. of Washington, D.C., 46 AD2d 437, 443-445; Reliance Ins. Cos. v Daly, 38 AD2d 715, 716). … The plaintiff … demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law declaring that the defendant is obligated to satisfy the first $250,000 of the judgment he obtained against the Giambrones.  McGuckin v Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exch., 2019 NY Slip Op 05654, Second Dept 7-17-19

 

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