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THE LAW REQUIRING THAT SEX OFFENDERS CANNOT RESIDE WITHIN 1000 FEET OF SCHOOL GROUNDS IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL, EVEN AS APPLIED TO AN OFFENDER WHOSE SEX OFFENSES INVOLVED ADULTS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a two-justice concurrence, determined defendant sex offender, in this habeas corpus proceeding, was not entitled to release on parole on the ground that the law prohibiting him from residing within 1000 feet of school grounds was unconstitutional. The concurrence called into question the effects of the law. Petitioner’s sex offenses involved adults, not children:

… [A]lthough the open parole release date granted to petitioner cannot be revoked absent procedural due process, we are unpersuaded that he has a further “liberty interest [or] fundamental right . . . to be free from special conditions of parole” regarding his residence under either the Federal or the State Constitution … . …

… [P]etitioner has not satisfied his “heavy burden of showing that [Executive Law § 259-c (14)] is ‘so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes’ as to be irrational” … . Petitioner may or may not be correct when he says that the mandatory condition does not achieve its legitimate goals, but the argument that there are “better or wiser ways to achieve the law’s stated objectives” must be addressed to the Legislature … . Thus, the mandatory condition comports with substantive due process, and petitioner is not entitled to immediate release. People ex rel. Johnson v Superintendent, Adirondack Corr. Facility, 2019 NY Slip Op 05359, Third Dept 7-3-19

 

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