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DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA REQUIRED BY CPLR 3211(a)(1) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant insurer’s (Reliastar’s) motion to dismiss based on documentary evidence should not have been granted. Plaintiffs sued for breach of contract when Reliastar canceled the life insurance policy:

“To succeed on a motion to dismiss based upon documentary evidence pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), the documentary evidence must utterly refute the plaintiff’s factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law”… . “In order for evidence to qualify as documentary,’ it must be unambiguous, authentic, and undeniable” … . “[J]udicial records, as well as documents reflecting out-of-court transactions such as mortgages, deeds, contracts, and any other papers, the contents of which are essentially undeniable, would qualify as documentary evidence in the proper case” … . “Conversely, letters, emails, and affidavits fail to meet the requirements for documentary evidence” … . Here, in support of that branch of its motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), Reliastar submitted the policy and certain policy notices, which, according to Reliastar, refuted the plaintiffs’ contention that the policy cancellation was the result of Reliastar’s breach of its obligations under the policy. The policy notices, however, were, in effect, letters, which fail to meet the requirements for documentary evidence within the meaning of CPLR 3211(a)(1) … . Magee-Boyle v Reliastar Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 2019 NY Slip Op 05118, Second Dept 6-26-19

 

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