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NO SHOWING THAT THE AMBULANCE SIREN OR EMERGENCY LIGHTS WERE IN USE WHEN THE INTERSECTION COLLISION OCCURRED, THEREFORE THERE WAS NO SHOWING THE RECKLESS DISREGARD STANDARD FOR EMERGENCY VEHICLES APPLIED, THE MUNICIPAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the municipal defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this ambulance traffic accident case should have been denied. The municipal defendants did not demonstrate that the reckless disregard standard for emergency vehicles applied because they did not present evidence the ambulance siren or emergency lights were in use:

… [W]hile the reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) applies to a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle involved in an emergency operation, who engages in specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b), the exemptions apply only when the authorized emergency vehicle sounded audible signals such as a siren and displayed at least one red light (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104[c]). Here, the municipal defendants failed to establish, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law under the reckless disregard standard of care, as they did not demonstrate that the siren and lights on the ambulance were activated as required for the exemptions set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b) to apply … . Wynter v City of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 04993, Second Dept 6-19-19

 

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