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THE RECKLESS DISREGARD STANDARD APPLIED TO DEFENDANT POLICE OFFICER WHO WAS RESPONDING TO AN EMERGENCY WHEN THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT OCCURRED, THE OFFICER TOOK PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AND THEREFORE HIS CONDUCT DID NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF RECKLESS DISREGARD OF THE SAFETY OF OTHERS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined “reckless disregard” standard for the operation of a police car in an emergency situation applied to the facts, and further found that the officer’s conduct did not rise to the level of “reckless disregard:”

We agree with defendants that the court erred in determining that the defendant officer’s conduct was not measured by the “reckless disregard” standard of care under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) … . That standard of care “applies when a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle involved in an emergency operation engages in the specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (b)” …  and, if applicable, the driver is “shielded from liability unless [he or she] is shown to have acted with reckless disregard’ of the safety of others” … . Here, there is no dispute that the defendant officer was operating an “authorized emergency vehicle” and was “involved in an emergency operation” at the time of the accident (§ 1104 [a]). Furthermore, defendants’ submissions in support of their motion established as a matter of law that the defendant officer was performing exempted conduct when he “proceed[ed] past a steady red signal . . . , but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation” … . …

Here, the defendant officer’s uncontroverted testimony established that he was responding to a disturbance call that was “[p]riority 1,” i.e., the highest priority level, and that he took several precautions before proceeding into the intersection against the red light. Specifically, he slowed his vehicle to an almost complete stop, looked to his right and left, and then slowly proceeded into the intersection at a speed of about five miles per hour. When plaintiffs’ vehicle came into the defendant officer’s peripheral vision, he “slammed” his brake and attempted to avoid colliding with plaintiffs’ vehicle. Where, as here, a defendant officer takes precautionary measures before engaging in exempted conduct under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (b), the police officer does not act with reckless disregard for the safety of others … . Levere v City of Syracuse, 2019 NY Slip Op 04613, Fourth Dept 6-7-19

 

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