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IT WAS (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW A POLICE OFFICER TO IDENTIFY DEFENDANT IN SECURITY CAMERA FOOTAGE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined it was (harmless) error to allow a police officer to identify defendant in security camera footage:

Defendant … contends that the court erred in permitting a police detective to give testimony identifying defendant as the shooter in the security camera footage and drawing certain inferences from that footage … . To the extent that defendant’s contention is preserved for our review (see CPL 470.05 [2]), we conclude that any error in the admission of that testimony is harmless … . We note that the court sustained at least one objection from defense counsel after a nonresponsive answer from the police detective and issued a curative instruction with respect to that answer, which the jury is presumed to have followed … . We also note that the court’s final instructions to the jury alleviated much of the prejudice of the police detective’s testimony of which defendant now complains. The court instructed the jury that they were the sole and exclusive judges of the facts, that the testimony of police officers should not automatically be accepted, and that defendant’s identity was a disputed issue in the case. The court also instructed the jury how it should evaluate the accuracy of identification testimony. Again, the jury is presumed to have followed those instructions … . People v Jordan, 2020 NY Slip Op 01817, Fourth Dept 3-13-20

 

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