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THE 3RD DEPARTMENT, REVERSING FAMILY COURT, DETERMINED IT WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (BORN 2003) TO ORDER A DNA TEST FOR PETITIONER, IN PART BECAUSE NOT KNOWING WHO HER BIOLOGICAL FATHER IS IS A SOURCE OF TURMOIL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined it was in the child’s best interests that petitioner undergo a paternity test:

In light of [the] evidence, as well as evidence revealed at the Lincoln hearing, we disagree with Family Court’s determination that equitable estoppel applies and find that it is in the child’s bests interests for DNA testing to occur. The record is clear that the child understands that William P. is her “legal” father and that there is a significant chance that petitioner is her biological father. Although testing could possibly impact the child’s relationship with William P., the record reveals that this relationship is already tumultuous and that some of this tumult may stem from the child’s uncertainty as to whether petitioner is in fact her biological father. Indeed, it is evident from the record that if the child learns that William P. is her biological father, this information would positively benefit their relationship. The record also reveals that communication between petitioner and the child has occurred, possibly in violation of a court order, but that communication nevertheless occurred and it has had a clear effect on the child that cannot be mitigated by refusing to order a DNA test. In fact, DNA testing can mitigate the turmoil in the child’s life that presently exists because she does not know who her biological father is. Although we are certainly mindful of the inherent inequities in allowing a DNA test to occur given the child’s age [born 2003], our analysis must turn exclusively on the best interests of the child … . To that end, we are also mindful that, if petitioner is found to be the child’s biological father, given his lengthy incarceration, the child will not be able to enjoy a “traditional” parent-child relationship with him. However, petitioner and the child would be able to communicate by way of letters, telephone contact and potentially through visitation at the prison. Matter of Stephen N. v Amanda O., 2019 NY Slip Op 04510, Third Dept 6-6-19

 

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