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You are here: Home1 / Criminal Law2 / THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT FOLLOW THE CORRECT PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING...
Criminal Law

THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT FOLLOW THE CORRECT PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS ELIGIBLE FOR YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS; EVEN WHERE THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED AN ARMED FELONY, WHICH CAN DISQUALIFY A DEFENDANT FROM THE STATUS, THE STATUTORY FACTORS WHICH WOULD NONETHELESS ALLOW YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS MUST BE CONSIDERED AND PLACED ON THE RECORD (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined Supreme Court did not follow the correct procedure with respect to whether the defendant should be afforded youthful offender status. Although the defendant pled guilty to an armed felony, which can render him ineligible for youthful offender status, the court was required to consider the factors which would render him eligible despite the armed felony and to do so on the record:

… [T]he Court of Appeals has held that, “when a defendant has been convicted of an armed felony . . ., and the only barrier to his or her youthful offender eligibility is that conviction, the court is required to determine on the record whether the defendant is an eligible youth by considering the presence or absence of the factors set forth in CPL 720.10 (3). The court must make such a determination on the record ‘even where the defendant has failed to ask to be treated as a youthful offender, or has purported to waive his or her right to make such a request’ pursuant to a plea bargain”… . If the court determines that the offender is not an eligible youth, the inquiry is at an end; however, “if the court determines that the defendant is an eligible youth based on the presence of one or more of the CPL 720.10 (3) factors, . . . [t]he court [then] must exercise its discretion a second time to determine whether the eligible youth should be granted youthful offender treatment pursuant to CPL 720.20 (1)” … . …

The record before us does not conclusively establish that Supreme Court reached a determination, as required by CPL 720.10, regarding defendant’s eligibility for youthful offender treatment in the first instance. The court made no mention of the factors set forth in CPL 720.10 (3) and, instead of first determining defendant’s eligibility for youthful offender treatment pursuant to that statute, appears to have moved to the second step and determined that youthful offender treatment was inappropriate under CPL 720.20. People v Colon, 2019 NY Slip Op 04498, Third Dept 6-6-19

 

June 6, 2019
Tags: Third Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2019-06-06 17:39:102020-01-24 05:46:04THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT FOLLOW THE CORRECT PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS ELIGIBLE FOR YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS; EVEN WHERE THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED AN ARMED FELONY, WHICH CAN DISQUALIFY A DEFENDANT FROM THE STATUS, THE STATUTORY FACTORS WHICH WOULD NONETHELESS ALLOW YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS MUST BE CONSIDERED AND PLACED ON THE RECORD (THIRD DEPT).
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