You are here: / / STATEMENT MADE BY BANK EMPLOYEE TO THE EFFECT THE BANK WAS CLOSING THE...

STATEMENT MADE BY BANK EMPLOYEE TO THE EFFECT THE BANK WAS CLOSING THE ACCOUNT BECAUSE OF CONCERNS ABOUT MONEY LAUNDERING WAS NON-ACTIONABLE OPINION, THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DEFAMATION CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this defamation action, determined that defendant-bank’s (Capital One’s) motion for summary judgment should have been granted. The statement at issue, made by a bank employee named Mukhi,  was deemed to be non-actionable opinion:

The plaintiff is a shareholder of a nursing home business, Parkview Care and Rehabilitation Center, Inc. (hereinafter Parkview), that maintained a bank account at the defendant, Capital One … . Ann Gottlieb, who provided administrative and back-office services to Parkview, received a letter from Capital One indicating that Parkview’s account would soon be closed. When Gottlieb contacted Capital One about the closure, Sanjay Mukhi, a Capital One employee, told her that if Parkview removed the plaintiff as a signatory on the bank account, the account would not be closed. … The complaint alleges that Mukhi stated to Gottlieb that the issue was one of corporate compliance and that, as to “anyone who was a signatory on an account with Western Union or a pawn shop or check cashing business, they [Capital One] did not know who they were dealing with and [the plaintiff] was working with a check cashing business and they [Capital One] were therefore concerned that [the plaintiff] was engaged in money laundering.” * * *

The allegedly defamatory statement was made in the context of Mukhi’s explanation for the closure of Parkview’s account due to a corporate compliance issue. The overall content of the communication suggested that Capital One would be “concerned” about money laundering whenever “anyone” was a signatory on an account with a check cashing business, not that Capital One was actually accusing the plaintiff of this crime. Based upon the content of the communication and the overall context in which it was made, the average listener would take the statement to be one of opinion … .

Moreover, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the allegedly defamatory statement was not one of actionable mixed opinion. Instead, it was “a statement of opinion which is accompanied by a recitation of the facts upon which it is based” … . There was no implication that Mukhi knew ” certain facts, unknown to [the] audience, which support [the speaker’s] opinion and are detrimental to the person’ being discussed” … . Landa v Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 2019 NY Slip Op 03779, Second Dept 5-15-19

 

You might also like
PURSUANT TO THE FORECLOSURE ABUSE PREVENTION ACT (FAPA) THE BANK IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING (1) THE VOLUNTARY DISCONTINUANCE STOPPED THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, AND (2) THE DEBT WAS NOT ACCELERATED BECAUSE THE BANK DID NOT HAVE STANDING WHEN THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS BROUGHT (SECOND DEPT). ​
Only Sellers’, Not Buyers’, Agent Can Be Liable for Failure to Disclose Lead Paint Dangers
Insurance Company’s Failure to Submit Second Request for Verification of No-Fault Claim Precluded Tolling of 30-Day Payment Period
DEFENSE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE, THE JURY FOUND DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT AND THERE WAS NO REASONABLE VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE IN WHICH DEFENDANT’S NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.
BECAUSE THE COURT DID NOT IMPOSE CONDITIONS ON THE PLEAS AND SENTENCING COMMITMENTS, THE SENTENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENHANCED BASED ON THE PURPORTED VIOLATIONS OF CERTAIN CONDITIONS, INCLUDING THE DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO APPEAR AT SENTENCING, ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED, THE APPELLATE COURT CONSIDERED IT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).
THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH A DEFENSE AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT).
Difference Between Law of the Case and Issue and Claim Preclusion Explained
THE REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT DID NOT INCLUDE THE CLOSING DATE OR THE MORTGAGE TERMS; THE CONTRACT WAS THEREFORE UNENFORCEABLE PURSUANT TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JURY VERDICT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE... DEFENDANT DID NOT STRIKE PLAINTIFF AND WAS UNDER NO DUTY TO PROTECT PLAINTIFF...