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CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT TO A ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENFORCED, PLAINTIFF HAD NO CONTROL OVER WHEN THE DEFENDANT COULD TAKE AN ACTION WHICH BREACHED THE CONTRACT, HERE THE ALLEGED BREACH BY DEFENDANT DIDN’T TAKE PLACE UNTIL AFTER THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that, under the facts, the contractual provision creating a one year statute of limitations for a breach of contract action was not fair and should not have been enforced. It was not the duration of the limitations period that was deemed unfair, rather it was the defendant’s lack of control over the actions by the plaintiff which could be deemed to have breached the contract:

There is nothing inherently unreasonable about the one-year period of limitation, to which the parties here freely agreed … . “The problem with the limitation period in this case is not its duration, but its accrual date” … . It is neither fair nor reasonable to require that an action be commenced within one year from the date of the plaintiff’s substantial completion of its work on the project, while imposing a condition precedent to the action that was not within the plaintiff’s control and which was not met within the limitations period. “A limitation period’ that expires before suit can be brought is not really a limitation period at all, but simply a nullification of the claim” … . The limitation period in the subcontract conflicts with the conditions precedent to payment becoming due to the plaintiff, which, under the circumstances of this case, acted to nullify any claim the plaintiff might have for breach of the subcontract. Therefore, interpreting the subcontract against the defendant, which drafted the agreement … , we find that the one-year limitation period is unenforceable under the circumstances here … . D&S Restoration, Inc. v Wenger Constr. Co., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 02768, Second Dept 4-25-18

​CIVIL PROCEDURE (CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT TO A ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENFORCED, PLAINTIFF HAD NO CONTROL OVER WHEN THE DEFENDANT COULD TAKE AN ACTION WHICH BREACHED THE CONTRACT, HERE THE ALLEGED BREACH BY DEFENDANT DIDN’T TAKE PLACE UNTIL AFTER THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD (SECOND DEPT))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT TO A ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENFORCED, PLAINTIFF HAD NO CONTROL OVER WHEN THE DEFENDANT COULD TAKE AN ACTION WHICH BREACHED THE CONTRACT, HERE THE ALLEGED BREACH BY DEFENDANT DIDN’T TAKE PLACE UNTIL AFTER THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT TO A ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENFORCED, PLAINTIFF HAD NO CONTROL OVER WHEN THE DEFENDANT COULD TAKE AN ACTION WHICH BREACHED THE CONTRACT, HERE THE ALLEGED BREACH BY DEFENDANT DIDN’T TAKE PLACE UNTIL AFTER THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD (SECOND DEPT))

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