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THE SCARANGELLA EXCEPTION TO STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY WHICH MAY APPLY WHEN A SAFETY FEATURE IS AVAILABLE BUT THE BUYER CHOOSES NOT TO PURCHASE IT, MAY BE APPLICABLE EVEN WHEN THE BUYER IS A RENTAL BUSINESS, SUPREME COURT’S AND THE APPELLATE DIVISION’S CONTRARY RULING REVERSED, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a dissenting opinion, reversing the Appellate Division and ordering a new trial, determined: (1) the so-called Scarangella exception may apply where the manufacturer sells its product to a rental business; and (2) the jury instruction misstated the law concerning a manufacturer’s liability where its product is sold to a rental business. The Scarangella case carved out an exception to strict products liability which may apply when the manufacturer has made a safety feature optional and the buyer chooses not to purchase it. Here the plaintiff was operating a Bodcat loader when he was crushed by a small tree which came into the cab. Bobcat sells a cab enclosure (“door kit”) which may have deflected the tree. The rental company, Taylor, which purchased the Bobcat and rented it to plaintiff, did not outfit the rented Bobcat with the door kit. The trial court held that the Scarangella exception is never available to a manufacturer where the product is sold to a rental company. The Court of Appeals disagreed and held the Scarangella exception can be available where a rental business is the purchaser, depending upon the evidence:

[In Scarangella] we held that a product is not defective — and a manufacturer or seller is not strictly liable for a design defect based upon a claim that optional safety equipment should have been a standard feature — when the following three conditions are met: “(1) the buyer is thoroughly knowledgeable regarding the product and its use and is actually aware that the safety feature is available; (2) there exist normal circumstances of use in which the product is not unreasonably dangerous without the optional equipment; and (3) the buyer is in a position, given the range of uses of the product, to balance the benefits and the risks of not having the safety device in the specifically contemplated circumstances of the buyer’s use of the product” … . When these elements are present, “the buyer, not the manufacturer, is in the superior position to make the risk-utility assessment, and a well-considered decision by the buyer to dispense with the optional safety equipment will excuse the manufacturer from liability” … . * * *

Having deemed Scarangella to be wholly inapplicable, neither the trial court nor the Appellate Division examined whether Bobcat raised a triable question of fact warranting a Scarangella charge. … For purposes of resolution of this appeal, it is sufficient to observe as a matter of law, based on the evidence presented at this trial, that Bobcat was not entitled to a directed verdict in its favor on the Scarangella exception. Whether a Scarangella instruction will be appropriate on retrial is a matter for the trial court to determine based on the evidence presented at that time.  Fasolas v Bobcat of N.Y., Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 03657, CtApp 5-9-19

 

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