You are here: / / PLAINTIFF-TENANT IS DISABLED BY DEPRESSION, DEFENDANT-LANDLORD’S...
, , ,

PLAINTIFF-TENANT IS DISABLED BY DEPRESSION, DEFENDANT-LANDLORD’S REFUSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST TO KEEP AN EMOTIONAL SUPPORT DOG IN HIS APARTMENT CONSTITUTED DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, THE LANDLORD’S LIMITING PLAINTIFF’S LEASE TERM TO THREE MONTHS CONSTITUTED IMPERMISSIBLE RETALIATION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff-tenant’s discrimination and retaliation claims against defendant landlord should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff demonstrated his need for an emotional support dog (he suffers from debilitating depression) and further demonstrated the landlord’s denial of his request to keep a dog was discriminatory, and the landlord’s reduction of the lease term to three months constituted impermissible retaliation:

… [T]he parties have strictly limited their arguments on appeal on the question of discrimination to two narrow and carefully circumscribed issues: (1) whether defendant has a qualifying disability within the meaning of the FHA [Fair Housing Act] and the HRL [Human Rights Law] and (2) whether the accommodation he requested was “necessary to afford [him] equal opportunity to use and enjoy [his] dwelling” as provided in the statutes (42 USC § 3604 [f] [3] [B]; see Executive Law § 296 [18] [2]). * * *

… [B]ased upon defendant’s significant limitations in the major life activities of working and interacting with others, we are satisfied that he is disabled within the meaning of the FHA … . …

The HRL’s definition of disability is broader than those used in the federal disability statutes … . The HRL does not require a showing of a limitation in a major life activity, but instead defines disability, as pertinent here, as “a physical, mental or medical impairment . . . [that] is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques” (Executive Law § 292 [21] [a]). Defendant’s therapist, a clinical psychologist, testified in some detail regarding the clinical techniques used to diagnose depression and defendant’s specific symptoms … . …

… [W]e find that defendant “offered sufficient evidence that having [an emotional support] dog would affirmatively enhance his quality of life by ameliorating the effects of his disability,” and thus demonstrated necessity within the meaning of the FHA and the HRL … . * * *

We are satisfied that plaintiff’s actions were sufficiently adverse to constitute interference with the exercise of defendant’s rights. Notably, discrimination against a disabled person in the terms or conditions of a lease is prohibited by the FHA and its implementing regulations … . Hollandale Apts. & Health Club, LLC v Bonesteel, 2019 NY Slip Op 03718, Third Dept 5-9-19

 

You might also like
MOTIONS IN LIMINE WHICH AFFECT THE SCOPE OF THE TRIAL ARE APPEALABLE; TWO-YEAR WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIED TO THE MUNICIPALITIES; PRECLUDING EXPERT TESTIMONY BASED UPON DISCLOSURE DEFICIENCIES WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION (THIRD DEPT).
Retroactive Transfer of Liability to Special Fund Proper
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN APPEALABLE ORDER IN A SORA RISK-LEVEL PROCEEDING EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).
IN THIS DOG-BITE CASE, DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED SHE WAS NOT AWARE OF HER DOG’S VICIOUS PROPENSITIES; PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ON THAT ISSUE; DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER HOTEL DEFENDANTS WERE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF A SNOWMOBILE TOUR GUIDE UNDER AN APPARENT AGENCY THEORY.
COUNTY COURT FOUND THAT DEFENDANT’S CONFESSION TO SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITH THE VICTIM WAS NOT CORROBORATED AND DISMISSED THE RAPE COUNTS; THE THIRD DEPARTMENT EXPLAINED THE CRITERIA FOR CORROBORATION EVIDENCE AND FOUND IT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE RAPE CHARGES (THIRD DEPT).
FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED MOTHER’S VISITATION PETITION FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE (THIRD DEPT).
DEFENDANT DID NOT PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT OVER PLAINTIFF’S LAND; PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROVE THE DAMAGES ELEMENT OF TRESPASS (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

INCLUSION OF CLAIMANT’S PHOTOGRAPH ON A WALL OF SHAME DEPICTING PERSONS... THE SCARANGELLA EXCEPTION TO STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY WHICH MAY APPLY WHEN...