You are here: / / COUNTY COURT COULD NOT LEGALLY FULFILL THE SENTENCING PROMISE THAT INDUCED...

COUNTY COURT COULD NOT LEGALLY FULFILL THE SENTENCING PROMISE THAT INDUCED DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA, PLEA VACATED AND THE MATTER REMITTED FOR THE IMPOSITION OF A SENTENCE WHICH COMPORTS WITH DEFENDANT’S EXPECTATIONS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined defendant’s guilty plea was induced by a sentencing promise County Court could not fulfill. The plea was vacated and the matter was remitted for imposition of a sentence that comports with defendant’s expectations:

Penal Law § 70.30 (3) provides that “the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence imposed on a person shall be credited with and diminished by the amount of time the person spent in custody prior to the commencement of such sentence as a result of the charge that culminated in the sentence.” Penal Law § 70.30 (3) further provides that “[i]n the case of an indeterminate sentence, if the minimum period of imprisonment has been fixed by the court . . . , the credit shall also be applied against the minimum period.” That credit, however, “shall not include any time that is credited against the term . . . of any previously imposed sentence . . . to which the person is subject” … . Thus, “a person is prohibited from receiving jail time credit against a subsequent sentence when such credit has already been applied to time served on a previous sentence’ ” … . Inasmuch as defendant was serving a sentence on a prior conviction throughout the instant proceedings, the court could not legally fulfill its promise to credit defendant’s jail time against his sentence in this matter.

It is well established that “[a] guilty plea induced by an unfulfilled promise either must be vacated or the promise honored” … . “Where, as here, the originally promised sentence cannot be imposed in strict compliance with the plea agreement, the sentencing court may impose another lawful sentence that comports with the defendant’s legitimate expectations” … . People v Mccullen, 2019 NY Slip Op 03180, Fourth Dept 4-26-19

 

You might also like
Maneuvering a Heavy Door from a Scissors Lift to the Door Opening on the Second Floor Was Not an Elevation-Related Risk within the Meaning of Labor Law 240(1)/Nature of Labor Law 200 Action Explained
THE ARGUMENT THAT THE PROBATION OFFICER’S SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S RESIDENCE WAS UNLAWFUL AND UNREASONABLE BECAUSE IT WAS BASED SOLELY ON AN UNCORROBORATED ANONYMOUS TIP WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL, THE DISSENT DISAGREED; DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE (FOURTH DEPT).
17-YEAR-OLD’S ARE STATUTORILY EXCLUDED FROM THE CLASS OF VICTIMS UNDER PENAL LAW 263.11, TO WHICH DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY; RISK-LEVEL REDUCED FROM TWO TO ONE (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANTS LOST TITLE TO THE PROPERTY WHEN THE FORECLOSURE SALE TOOK PLACE, NOT WHEN THE JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE WAS ENTERED, THEREFORE PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGED EXPOSURE TO LEAD PAINT TOOK PLACE WHEN THE DEFENDANTS STILL HELD TITLE (FOURTH DEPT).
STATUTE CRIMINALIZING THE POSSESSION OF AN UNLICENSED FIREARM DOES NOT VIOLATE THE SECOND AMENDMENT (FOURTH DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE ROAD ON WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS DRIVING HIS ATV WHEN HE WAS INJURED WAS SUITABLE FOR RECREATIONAL USE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT FINDING THE LANDOWNER WAS IMMUNE FROM SUIT UNDER THE RECREATIONAL USE IMMUNITY PROVISION OF GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW 9-103 SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 4TH DEPT.
Dismissal as Time-Barred Is a Dismissal On the Merits for Purposes of Res Judicata
DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF DIRECTING THE CODEFENDANT TO KILL; THE CODEFENDANT WAS ACQUITTED OF MURDER; THE VERDICTS WERE REPUGNANT; DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE REPUGNANT VERDICTS (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FOR CAUSE JUROR CHALLENGES SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, JURORS COULD NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY... THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE DEFENDANT IN THIS...