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NOTE HOLDER’S COMPLIANCE WITH NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 NOT DEMONSTRATED, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined respondent (the holder of the note) did not demonstrate compliance with the notice provisions of RPAPL 1304. Therefore respondent’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted:

“[P]roper service of RPAPL 1304 notice on the borrower or borrowers is a condition precedent to the commencement of a foreclosure action, and the plaintiff has the burden of establishing satisfaction of this condition” … . “The statute requires that such notice . . . be sent by registered or certified mail, and also by first-class mail, to the last known address of the borrower” … . …

The respondent, which submitted only a copy of the required notice, and did not submit any evidence that the notice was mailed in the manner required by the statute, failed to meet its prima facie burden with respect to the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304. Specifically, the respondent did not submit “an affidavit of service, [or] proof of mailing by the post office evincing that it properly served the defendant pursuant to RPAPL 1304 [by registered or certified mail and also by first-class mail to his last known address]” … , or “proof of a standard office mailing procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed, sworn to by someone with personal knowledge of the procedure” … . Marchai Props., L.P. v Fu, 2019 NY Slip Op 02511, Second Dept 4-3-19

 

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