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QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT SUPERVISED AND DIRECTED PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE LABOR LAW 200 AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED.

With respect to one of the defendants (Irwin) the Second Department determined Supreme Court should have denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 200 and common-law negligence claims. Plaintiff injured his knee carrying a 200 pound, 30 foot beam. The defendant’s own submission raised questions of fact about whether defendant supervised and directed plaintiff’s work, and whether plaintiff was a “special employee” such that his only remedy was Workers’ Compensation benefits:

The Supreme Court erred, however, in determining that Irwin was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims against it. The evidence submitted by Irwin in support of its summary judgment motion demonstrated that Irwin supervisors were present at the construction site every day supervising the work, and that these supervisors gave the plaintiff his daily work assignments. The plaintiff testified at his deposition, a transcript of which was submitted in support of Irwin’s motion, that on the date of the accident, an Irwin supervisor assigned him to the task of moving the rafters, unassisted, and instructed the plaintiff to retrieve specific equipment in furtherance of the task. When the plaintiff complained to the supervisor about the manner in which the work was to be performed, the supervisor told him to “just do it.” …

Pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law §§ 11 and 29(6), an employee injured during the course of his employment is limited to recovering Workers’ Compensation benefits, and is not entitled to bring an action against the employer. This exclusive remedy rule also applies to a “special employee,” defined as “one who is transferred for a limited time of whatever duration to the service[s] of another”… . Whether a special employment relationship exists is generally an issue of fact … , and requires consideration of many factors, the most of important of which is who directs and controls the manner, details, and ultimate result of the employee’s work … . Additionally, the employee must have had knowledge of, and consented to, the special employment relationship … . As discussed above, the evidence submitted by Irwin raised a triable issue of fact as to whether Irwin had the authority to supervise and control the manner in which the plaintiff performed his work. Likewise, the evidence submitted by Irwin raised a triable issue of fact as to whether Irwin had the “exclusive right to control and direct the manner, details, and ultimate result” of the plaintiff’s work, such that a special employment relationship was created … . Additionally, Irwin failed to submit evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff had knowledge of, and consented to, a special employment relationship … . Zupan v Irwin Contr., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 08229, 2nd Dept 12-7-16

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT SUPERVISED AND DIRECTED PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE LABOR LAW 200 AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED)/WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT SUPERVISED AND DIRECTED PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE LABOR LAW 200 AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED)

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