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PLAINTIFF HOMEOWNER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO PAYMENTS MADE TO AN UNLICENSED HOME IMPROVEMENT CONTRACTOR FOR WORK PERFORMED SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE CONTRACTOR WAS UNLICENSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was not entitled to the return of payments made to defendant unlicensed contractor for work performed. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on that cause of action should not have been granted:

Although an unlicensed contractor may not enforce a home improvement contract against a homeowner or seek recovery in quantum meruit for work performed … , here, the defendant is not seeking to enforce the parties’ contract or to recover in quantum meruit. Rather, the plaintiff homeowner is seeking to recover money already paid to the defendant pursuant to the contract. Where a homeowner receives the benefit of the services of an unlicensed contractor, he or she is not entitled to recoup payments made for such services solely on the basis that the defendant was unlicensed … . “The parties, in these circumstances, should be left as they are” … . Rusin v Design-Apart USA, Ltd., 2019 NY Slip Op 05172, Second Dept 6-26-19

 

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