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DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASES SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE, THE JURY FOUND DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT BUT FURTHER FOUND THE NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE FALL, HOWEVER, THE NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE WERE INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict in this slip and fall case should have been granted:

The plaintiff alleged that after entering the auditorium to attend the showing of a movie at the defendant’s multiplex theater, she entered a row of seats, slipped on what she believed to be popcorn oil, and fell. After the movie ended, the plaintiff realized that she was injured when she had difficulty rising from her seat.

… [T]he jury rendered a verdict finding that the defendant was negligent, but that such negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries.

Where, as here, the issues of negligence and proximate cause were inextricably interwoven, the jury’s finding that the defendant was negligent, but that such negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries, was not supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence … . The plaintiff, and her friend who accompanied her on the day of the accident, both consistently testified that the plaintiff slipped and fell on an oily substance on the floor of the auditorium. The defendants failed to submit any evidence to refute this testimony. Thus, the plaintiff’s motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the jury verdict should have been granted. Mitchell v Quincy Amusements, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 00430, Second Dept 1-23-19

 

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