You are here: / / JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WHEN...
, ,

JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WHEN PLAINTIFF BANK ATTEMPT TO TO BRING PREVIOUSLY FILED PAPERS INTO COMPLIANCE WITH SUBSEQUENT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, dismissed the foreclosure action when plaintiff bank attempted to bring previously filed documents into compliance with subsequent administrative orders:

“A court’s power to dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, is to be used sparingly and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant dismissal”… . Here, the plaintiff’s counsel attempted to comply, in good faith, with Administrative Orders 548/10 and 431/11 of the Chief Administrative Judge, which did not exist at the time of the commencement of the action, or at the time of the plaintiff’s prior motion for an order of reference. Under such circumstances, dismissal was not warranted. Nothing in the Administrative Orders requires the dismissal of an action merely because the plaintiff’s counsel discovers that there was some irregularity or defect in a prior submission, nor is the plaintiff effectively required to commence an entirely new action … . JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Laszlo, 2019 NY Slip Op 01205, Second Dept 2-20-19

 

You might also like
Failure to Eliminate Comparative Negligence Precluded Summary Judgment to Plaintiff In Car-Accident Action
PLAINTIFF DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ON ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE BLACK ICE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 2ND DEPT.
THE REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE EXCUSE WAS INADEQUATE BUT THE CITY HAD TIMELY NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE CLAIM AND WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DELAY (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT HOMEOWNER DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONTROL THE CONDUCT OF HER ESTRANGED HUSBAND WHO ALLEGEDLY ASSAULTED PLAINTIFF IN DEFENDANT’S HOME; THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES WAS THE ESTRANGED HUSBAND’S ACT; DEFENDANT HOMEOWNER’S MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Marching Band Director Did Not Assume the Risk of Injury Caused by a Defect in the Roadway
ALTHOUGH THE MANSLAUGHTER AND NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE CONVICTIONS WHERE SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, THOSE CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, THE POLICE OFFICER WAS KILLED BY ANOTHER DRIVER WHO WAS PASSING BY THE ACCIDENT SCENE A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF TIME AFTER THE DEFENDANT’S ACCIDENT (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THIS REAR END COLLISION CASE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Plaintiff Assumed the Risk of Stepping on Running Treadmill

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEEMED TIMELY SERVED, MEDICAL RECORDS... IT WAS (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ADMIT TESTIMONY OF THE PEOPLE’S DNA EXPERT,...